Investor Nation

The ACCJ Financial Services Forum advocates for stronger market policies in its latest white paper

The American Chamber of Commerce (ACCJ) is fully on board with the Japanese government’s stated ambition of transforming the nation into a global leader in asset and wealth management, with the chamber’s Financial Services Forum (FSF) broadly supportive of a series of policy initiatives announced by Tokyo since April 2023. But they point out that more can be achieved to better meet consumers’ needs and that vigilance is required to ensure the promised changes do not stall.

The FSF comprises the leadership of the chamber’s five financial services committees and is designed to ensure that the ACCJ’s position on financial services issues is approved by the board and addressed in a consistent manner.

After a close examination of the government’s proposals, the FSF issued a white paper in July entitled Transforming Japan into a Global Asset and Wealth Management Leader. Stating that “the commitment that the national government is making to the transformation of the investment industry is critical for success, as most of the essential resourcing and policies can be achieved only with central government leadership, action, and education,” the paper details a three-pronged strategy:

• Accelerating corporate governance reform.
• Reforming the asset management sector and asset ownership.
• Doubling asset-based income among individual investors.

The FSF white paper outlines its recommendations within the context of the Government of Japan’s Policy Plan for Promoting Japan as a Leading Asset Management Center, released in December 2023. This framework serves as the foundation for the government’s efforts to transform Japan into a global asset management leader and financial hub.

Corporate Governance Reform

The first issue highlighted by the FSF is to accelerate progress on corporate governance reforms in parallel with reforms to the asset management industry. The goal is to make Japan a global standard bearer by sharply increasing participation among individual investors and expanding access to asset-based income.

There is clear common ground with many of the plans of the Japanese government, some of which is outlined in a June 2024 statement entitled “Principles into Practice,” issued by the Council of Experts Concerning the Follow-up of Japan’s Stewardship Code and Japan’s Corporate Governance Code. This council operates under the joint secretariat of the Financial Services Agency (FSA) and the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).

The Japanese proposals emphasize greater corporate governance enforcement, training for independent directors, and stewardship activities, while the TSE has revised its listing rules to mandate English disclosures of financial statements and timely information effective April 1, 2025.

The FSF white paper makes clear, however, that many issues—including ensuring substantive reforms take root and enforcing deadlines for strategic shareholdings—remain incomplete or are still works in progress. Similarly, disclosure practices have improved, it points out, but there are concerns that some companies are still “going through the motions” instead of devoting the required effort to the procedures. Equally, there has been progress on efforts to unwind cross-shareholdings, although the paper emphasizes that greater reviews are still necessary.

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“Stating that ‘the commitment that the national government is making to the transformation of the investment industry is critical for success, as most of the essential resourcing and policies can be achieved only with central government leadership, action, and education,’ the paper details a three-pronged strategy.”

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“Board independence and diversity, progress on English-language disclosure, and electronic voting rights are cited as key improvements,” the white paper states. Transforming corporate governance “from a box-ticking exercise to a core business element” has received the strong support of Hiromi Yamaji, president of the Japan Exchange Group. This is seen as very important, but the white paper points out that “greater and quicker progress is needed to avoid complacency setting in among management, which could cause reform to stagnate.”

To ensure that does not happen, the FSF is calling on the FSA and the TSE to collaborate on a plan for stronger enforcement of the Corporate Governance Code and that the present recommendation that independent directors account for a minimum of one-third of Prime Market boards be increased to an outright majority. They would also like to see a new initiative to increase both the number and quality of training programs, with a focus on diverse director candidates.

Other proposals include making the recently extended tax incentives for spin-off companies permanent to enhance predictability when it comes to tax planning, promote the creation of innovative spin-offs, and optimize business portfolio strategy and planning. Yet another proposal in the white paper is for the TSE to work with listed companies to spread annual general meetings across the calendar and to permit virtual attendance by offshore investors.

Asset Management

Turning to asset management, 2023 legislation imposes a legal obligation on all parties in the investment chain to act in the best interest of customers. As the government implements its plan to translate this obli­gation into rules and regulations and/or codes of conduct for each set of players and actively enforce them, the FSF recommends that the FSA continue to take steps to strengthen measures that ensure the independence of asset management firms and improve the capabilities of management. It is also recommended that the FSA aggres­sively shift to a domestic retail brokerage revenue model from one dominated by transaction fees so that advisory fees become more important.

Other proposals include the introduction of a “comply-or-explain” approach to new standards, as well as formalizing a continuous process of monitoring implementation, with the outcomes published regularly and transparently.

Organizations beyond the ACCJ have also welcomed efforts by Japan to implement reforms in the asset management sector. The Washington DC-based Investment Company Institute (ICI) said in a July 1 statement:

“The Japanese government’s policy plan for the coming year consists of extremely important reforms, such as changes to Japan’s individual defined contribution retirement program, including increasing contribution limits and providing more opportunities for older workers to save,” said ICI President and Chief Executive Officer Eric J. Pan. “These reforms can help households adapt to changing macroeconomic conditions by making greater use of the diversified investments offered by asset managers to build household wealth, prepare for retirement and meet other important financial objectives.”

NISA and Asset-based Income

Pan also applauded the expansion of the Nippon Individual Savings Account (NISA) program through the simplification of operational procedures and promoting more people to take advantage of the scheme.

The changes to NISA were outlined by then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in a speech to the Economic Club of New York in September 2022 as a way of attracting more overseas companies into Japan and improving the offerings of the asset management industry. In a similar speech in September 2023, Kishida announced plans to establish special business zones for asset management firms where administrative procedures can be completed entirely in English. The administation of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has committed to continuing this important initiative.

This initiative ties in neatly with the third focus of the FSF’s white paper, individual investors and asset-based income, with the report pointing out that in comparison with the US and European markets, “Japan’s individual investment and retirement market has enormous growth potential and opportunities to better serve the needs of investors, which is particularly important in view of Japan’s demographic and fiscal challenges.”

The FSF recommends further expansion of NISA limits as well as the range of investments that would qualify. The fact that flows into NISA accounts have increased dramatically in response to the previous increase of annual investment limits to ¥3.6 million underlines just how popular this form of investment is becoming.

Stronger Market

Placing priority on developing and resourcing programs that nurture an ecosystem of independent financial advisers—and where individual investors can receive advice free of influence from the companies that are offering products—is another evolution called for in the white paper. This would strengthen the quality of financial advisers and enhance client–adviser relationships.

The FSF’s proposals may be ambitious and far-reaching, but the forum is confident that, if adopted, they can deliver benefits to both consumers and providers in the Japanese market, as well as transforming Japan into a global asset and wealth management leader.

Japan Surprises 2022

Ten possible twists and turns in the Year of the Tiger

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With the Year of the Tiger well underway, here is my annual list of Japan Surprises. These are not baseline scenarios or probability-ranked results of quantitative models but, rather, some of the things that keep me up at night thanks to that nagging suspicion that some events could change everything. And yes, there is plenty of room for positive surprises from Japan in 2022. Enjoy, send me your comments, and I wish you a prosperous and happy Year of the Tiger.

1. Kishida’s Dream Comes True: Wages Rise 3 Percent

After decades of wage restraint and unions lobbying for long-term job stability, rather than short-term pay hikes, Japan’s job market is now super tight. The war for talent is intensifying. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is opportunistic and right to follow his predecessor’s top-down call for higher wages; and his chances of success are higher than Abe’s ever were. Still, aggregate wage growth of more than 1.5–2 percent would be a big surprise. An even bigger surprise would be if Japan’s wage and income growth actually feeds higher consumption rather than an even bigger pile of under-the-mattress savings.

Watch out for more companies following Hitachi’s lead this year. Japan’s top conglomerate recently announced they’ll switch to hiring and promoting based on professional skills, rather than generalist ability and seniority. A switch to performance-based compensation starting this year is now corporate policy. If, as I suspect, Hitachi’s break with deeply entrenched labor compensation practices catches on and spreads to other companies, then we may see change. Japan’s average wage may not move up as much as Kishida desires, but the variance inside companies and among industries is poised to rise significantly.

This, in my view, is the reason Japan’s consumer spending could surprise on the upside in the second half of 2022: skills-based compensation equals higher job satisfaction, equals greater confidence, equals higher spending. Kishida watches out for the low end, while companies begin to incentivize human aspirations. And yes, this is exactly how Japan’s productivity boom will come about. If I’m right, prepare for positive surprises not just this year, but throughout the 2020s.

2. From Tax Liability to Regional Investments: Furusato Nozei 2.0

Japan runs one of the most innovative and successful redistribution policies in the world, its hometown tax program, furusato nozei.

Designed to revitalize rural communities, the scheme lets taxpayers nationwide buy goods and services offered by approved vendors from small towns and villages, with your purchase offset against next year’s tax bill. Of course, there are limits on how much can be deducted, but there is no question that furusato nozei works extremely well. Local producers are competing and beefing up their marketing to attract more “free-money” customers they did not have before, while Japanese taxpayers enjoy self-directing their hard-earned money towards goods and services they actually want, rather than just giving it up to the anonymous government. Make no mistake, Japan’s furusato nozei has made paying taxes fun and satisfying.

A positive surprise would be if Japanese leaders learn from this success and create furusato nozei 2.0. The current scheme channels income tax liabilities into consumption. In other words, it redirects the flow economy. A next generation version should focus on channeling assets into investments by redirecting the stock economy.

How? Just as local private producers now compete for national taxpayers’ yen, let local public leaders, activists, and politicians propose soft and hard infrastructure projects that need investment funds to get started. Again, national taxpayers all over Japan would be invited to evaluate and select the projects they want to support. When they make their investments, the amount would be credited against future fixed-asset or inheritance tax liabilities.

The economic impact is win–win. First, opening up prospects for investment money will energize local activists and leaders to get creative and propose concrete local soft and hard infrastructure improvement projects. Second, the scheme offers concrete incentives for Mr. and Mrs. Watanabe to unfreeze some of their massive pile of personal assets. Anything that can be done to turn mattress money into investments will be good for Japan.

Even better, if taxpayers can self-direct their hard-earned assets to socially productive investment projects of their choice, they will create a legacy for themselves and a better future for Japan’s coming generations. Here is a project worthy of being called New Capitalism, because the current system encourages you to do nothing but wait until your assets disappear into the black hole of inheritance tax payments.

3. Entitlement Reform: Asset-based Means Testing

Cutting public benefits and entitlements is unpopular in any country; but it is popular to tax the rich and redistribute wealth—particularly in Japan. As pressure mounts to fix runaway deficits, creative and unorthodox policy proposals to do so by cutting entitlements are being discussed.

Introducing financial means testing is one option. This is where, for example, anyone with net financial assets greater than, say, ¥10 million and no mortgage debt is no longer eligible for the full public pension or national healthcare. Here is an elegant policy solution that cuts entitlements and taxes the rich.

Importantly, asset-based means testing would redistribute wealth from the older generation (which owns the vast majority of financial assets) to the younger generation (which pays the vast majority of taxes). Yes, it’s a radical rethinking of the intergenerational contract, but nobody should be surprised by the creativity of Japan’s new generation of policymakers and politicians. Specifically, asset-based means testing is a pragmatic redistribution policy that can easily lend credibility and appeal to the design of New Capitalism. It would be a positive surprise to see concrete proposals along these lines in 2022, possibly even before the July upper-house elections.

4. Corporate Japan Starts Buying Startups

With very few exceptions, Japan Inc. has never really grown through acquisitions. In-house research and development and a proud our-team-first-and-only mentality have dominated, while mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have primarily produced turf battles and legacy redundancies rather than positive synergies. Case in point: two decades after Japan’s bank mergers, the three megabanks are still fighting shadow wars to stubbornly defend the proud legacy procedures and systems of the original partners.

For most Japan M&As, 1+1 barely adds up to 1.5. However, there has recently been some positive change, with younger chief executive officers—Recruit Co. Ltd.’s Hisayuki Idekoba, Sompo Holdings Inc.’s Kengo Sakurada, and Suntory Holdings Ltd.’s Takeshi Niinami, for example—unafraid to turn the challenges of growing through acquisitions into a real transformational opportunity. So, the 2022 surprise will be Japanese CEOs stepping out of their comfort zones and embarking on a full-blown, growth-through-acquisition strategy in general, and buying startups in particular.

The numbers speak for themselves. As in the United States, there are plenty of innovative and potentially transformative startups in Japan. Unlike the United States, Japan has establishment players that don’t buy outside innovation. Almost 90 percent of startup exits in Japan are through initial public offerings.

Meanwhile, about 90 percent of US startup exits are through acquisition. This difference in corporate growth strategy and leadership culture goes a long way in explaining the reason Japan’s established companies are less dynamic and less globally competitive than their US establishment counterparts.

In my view, a lack of startup innovation power is not Japan’s problem. The real issue is the almost utter unwillingness or inability of established players to leverage outside creativity to realize synergetic, transformational growth strategies. In fact, any analysis of the startup ecosystem in Japan quickly reveals that established corporations appear to be more interested in stealing from, or killing off, creative challengers.

No doubt this happens in Silicon Valley, but there is ample evidence that Japan’s establishment leadership culture is well behind in seeing startups and outside ventures as a pathway to new growth or a catalyst for often long-overdue internal transformation. Japan Inc. going on a startup buying spree would be a very positive surprise for 2022.

5. Japan Corporate Governance Goes Global, Japanese on Wall Street Boards

Corporate governance reform is on everyone’s agenda. Even the top stewards of US capitalism, the Business Roundtable, is advocating for a shift in focus from shareholder value to multiple stakeholder interests.

Well, thank you, but isn’t this exactly the sort of leadership at which Japanese CEOs supposedly excel? Yet, cross-national corporate board representation has been basically a one-way street. There are now just over 60 non-Japanese serving on the boards of Japanese listed companies, but you can count on one hand the number of Japanese nationals serving on the boards of US listed companies. There’s Oki Matsumoto at Mastercard Inc., Jun Makihara at Philip Morris International Inc., and Hiromichi Mizuno at Tesla, Inc. Looking beyond the United States, Japan is represented on just one other major global board, that of the Renault Group, on which sits Yu Serizawa. A righting of this imbalance would be a real surprise.

Should Japan-style corporate governance go global? Certainly not in its convoluted, insider-obsessed, accountability-light, and generally opaque manifestation of the keiretsu and post-bubble era. Reform is very necessary and has gathered considerable momentum over the past decade. In my view, a good way to judge whether true progress on corporate governance reform has been made is by whether (or when) US companies begin to appoint Japanese to their boards. At the very least, it would prove that Japan’s leaders have become more global, more open-minded, and are now capable of demonstrating to global peers how Japan-style corporate stewardship can be very relevant when building a better, more sustainable, and inclusive world. Perhaps an even bigger surprise would be US tycoons actually listening to their advice.

6. US Supply-Side Push Brings Good Deflation to the United States, World

Just as 2020 forced us all to become fast-study experts in virology, 2021 triggered a rush to understand inflation. By early 2022, the consensus was overwhelmingly that, yes, inflation is real and is structural, not transient.

The Federal Reserve is well behind the curve and will have to step on the brakes much harder and longer than we all thought likely just three months ago. The contrarian in me is thus on high alert. A real 2022 surprise would be a full-blown US supply-side recovery, pushing down prices and delivering good deflation to, first, the United States and then the world.

Possible? Absolutely. Just look at the sharp, and now increasingly structural, acceleration of US business formation, running at more than two times the pre-pandemic norm. It could well be that 2022 brings that magic combination of new enterprise meeting new super ambitious labor. It’s high time to point out that, for every three Americans who are part of the Great Resignation, there are four signing on for new (and higher-paying) jobs. All said, the real 2022 big surprise would be that, thank you, the American Dream is alive and well.

7. Bitcoin Accepted for Tax Payments

When asked to explain the difference between the US dollar and cryptocurrency, I often quip that the dollar is backed by approximately $4 trillion in tax liabilities. If these are not settled, the US government comes with guns and handcuffs to take away your freedom. Against this, bitcoin is backed by absolutely nothing. Unlike the governments of China, Japan, or European nations, the US government has remained remarkably tolerant of the open attack on the state’s currency monopoly led by crypto tycoons and evangelists. The American spirit of innovation before regulation and challenging authority appears to be alive and well. A real surprise would be if US lawmakers took the next step and moved from tolerance to acceptance. A new era of global finance will start on the day the US Internal Revenue Service agrees to accept bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies to settle tax liabilities. Until then, have fun trading crypto, but don’t ever forget to have enough of a real-dollar-liquidity cushion at least to pay your taxes.

8. China Synthetic Biology Moonshot for Domestic Food Security

China is the world’s largest importer of food, and this dependence on global food sources is perhaps the biggest tactical and strategic challenge leaders of the most populous nation face. So, it comes as no surprise that China has created massive incentives for its top scientists to speed up progress in synthetic biology in general, and the development of lab-grown and high tech-assisted food in particular. The question is not if, but when a super-massive solution will be announced by the country’s biotech leaders. The sooner it comes, the more of a surprise it will be. Just as the United States has become a net exporter of energy over the past decade, China moving towards food self-sufficiency will fundamentally change more than just trade patterns and economic dependencies. A science-based breakthrough on food security for China, and thus the world, would supersize the country’s credentials as the rightful global leader it aspires to be.

9. United We Stand: Global Covid Policy Commission

The pandemic has been with us for more than two years, yet it feels very much as though we’re nowhere close to agreeing on the optimal public policy response. Rebuilding public trust in both science and policymaking is poised to be one of the biggest post-Covid challenges. Surely, we should be able to do better than the every-strongman-for-himself response we have gotten almost everywhere. A huge positive surprise in 2022 would be the setting up of an independent global Covid policy commission, mandated to analyze—without fear or favor—all the policy measures taken around the world, including hard lockdowns, soft lockdowns, border closures, and quarantine regimes. The goal would be to acknowledge common ground for what has and has not worked.

In my view, the sooner global leaders pull together and demonstrate that they actually want to learn from the various responses to the pandemic, the better the chances that mankind in general, and public life in particular, will emerge stronger and more resilient from the calamity.

10. Germany Beats Brazil to Become Soccer World Champion

On December 18, the FIFA Soccer World Cup final will take place in Qatar. While it is still uncertain if Japan will qualify, Germany was the first team to do so. Team Deutschland not making it to the World Cup final would be not just a surprise, but a real shock. After all, I am German and, every four years, when the World Cup is held, I cannot help but unashamedly reveal a massive bias. May the best team win in 2022, the Year of the Tiger!

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This Time Is Different

A new and stronger Japan emerges

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“This time is different.” These are four very dangerous words. When you hear them, it always pays to be extra skeptical—especially in the context of someone giving you financial advice or presenting an economic forecast. Personally, I always hold on to my wallet extra tight when the “trust me, this time is different” clause is invoked. We’ve all been there in our respective professions and passions; it takes a thief to know a thief.

As an economic strategist and professional Japan optimist, I certainly do have an extra hard time trying to make my case. The legacy of Japan’s lost decades (1991–2009) is incredibly strong. I often get a similar reaction to the one that hard-core Elvis fans must get when they insist that the King lives on. However, unlike the King of Rock ’n’ Roll, the Japanese economy is very much alive. In fact, there is plenty of hard empirical evidence that Japan not only has changed, but also that it has what it takes to be an economic powerhouse—and the envy of the world in terms of economic sustainability.

So, what’s different this time? Why won’t Japan slide back into another lost decade? That won’t happen because three fundamental forces have changed from negative to positive:

• Corporate ownership
• Public policy
• Focus among the elite
• Competition Welcome

The ownership structure of corporate Japan has changed from a closed, insider-based system to an open, competitive one.

In economics, nothing matters more than ownership. Equity ownership dictates the allocation of resources. It is the very basis of power for all the essential corporate decisions: financial, strategic, human capital. Ownership defines the true corporate culture. Twenty years ago, more than half the equity ownership of Japan Inc. was tied up in mochiai (cross-shareholding). Today, it is less than five percent.

This breakdown of Japan’s keiretsu (company network) ownership structure is the key reason to be bullish on Japan. The old Japan Inc. was a system of insider capitalism that incentivized bad economic decision-making. Group banks kept lending to group companies, not on the basis of economic merit but for the sake of maintaining relationships. Supply-chain group companies were forced into utter dependence on the conglomerates and the banks that owned them. This allowed de facto zero price power and no room for competitive diversification or independence.

Imagine if your company had been built using your brother-in-law as a supplier. Cutting him off when a more efficient and better supplier emerged basically would be impossible, while incentivizing him to change his ways would take time.

In finance, the mochiai fueled a debt bubble and then kept zombie companies alive for much longer than their economic worth warranted. In management, this enforced a “closed fortress” corporate culture of rule followers and yes-man workers who, in the case of failure, had nowhere to go, because the other fortresses were not open to them.

“While the past decades were marked by defeatism and fatalism, today’s Japan is marked by ambition, confidence, and a newfound idealism.”

— Quote Source

In contrast, today’s corporate Japan has liberated itself from the group-ownership straitjacket and has turned from a membership-only club to an open-for-business structure.

The recent case involving attempted shareholder vote suppression at Toshiba Corporation proves the point. The old Japan Inc. would have gone out of its way to keep Toshiba in the group, thus holding the company’s assets hostage to continued in-group control. Instead, Toshiba’s ownership has fundamentally changed.

Outside capital has come in and the assets are being strategically refocused on core competence. This includes previously unthinkable actions. Shareholders ousted the chief executive officer and chairman, while the board has become dominated by outside directors’ opinions—even going so far as to propose a breakup of the company as the best forward strategy for all stakeholders.

Just a couple of years ago, such moves were unimaginable; but now they are happening. While Toshiba is a dramatic case, we are seeing many examples of economically rational changes in corporate strategies across all industries.

Make no mistake—this new openness has been made possible by the removal of the cross-shareholding structure. Japan Inc. has turned from being closed and insider-focused to being open; not just for business, but to new strategic partnerships, open innovation, and letting core-competence assets sweat like never before. Yes, it is different this time.

Pro-growth Policy

Public policy has changed from political instability and ad hocism to stability and pro-growth consistency.

From 1990 to 2012, Japan had one of the most unstable political leadership regimes in modern history. In contrast, today’s Japan has become a bastion of political stability. Yes, we’ve just had an election, and a new prime minister, Fumio Kishida, has taken office, but the policy team is full-on Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In sharp contrast to the aforementioned period of regime uncertainty, today the LDP controls just about two-thirds of the Diet.

Make no mistake: Japan’s LDP is the envy of the democratic world. Unlike the situation for leaders in the United States and most European countries, where ruling parties are struggling to secure a majority, Kishida’s political and parliamentary control is rock solid. He can actually get things done. This is good news for the private sector—whether we identify as entrepreneurs, business leaders, investors, consumers, pensioners, or a combination thereof.

Of course, you may agree or disagree with some of Kishida’s policies but, most importantly, he is turning out to be completely predictable and his actions are consistent with those of his predecessors. Just like former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, he immediately got to work and ordered a record boost in fiscal spending. Also like Abe, he instructed the central bank to reaffirm the two-percent inflation target.

Again, Japan stands out compared with the United States and European nations, which all are beginning to cut back on policy stimulus. Clearspeak: Kishida may have campaigned on promises to create a new form of capitalism; but the moment he took office, he turbocharged exactly the same old engines of growth used by his predecessors.

For the private sector, the predictability and consistency of policy is often more important than the content. The worst thing the government can do is to flip-flop. The less trust entrepreneurs and business leaders can place in stable policy—whether tax and labor laws, investment rules, energy policy, or healthcare costs—the more cautious they become. Just as Japan’s political stability during the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s was important to her economic success, the trap of political instability and regime uncertainty was a huge negative factor cutting down corporate animal spirits and the private sector’s willingness to take risks and invest for the future.

Whether or not you like Team Kishida, the major players do have a solid track record of being pro-business and pro-growth. There’s no question that more could be done to promote entrepreneurship and growth, but the basic direction is constructive. Most importantly, a premature tightening of policy is now unlikely. Where the 1990–2012 period was marked by repetitive stop-go-stop monetary and fiscal boom–bust cycles, Team Kishida is keeping a steady course of modest fiscal and monetary support.

In turn, this creates ideal conditions for the private sector to develop not just stable growth, but to reach escape velocity. Yes, this time is different—but not because Kishida is creating a new kind of capitalism, but because he’s Machiavellian enough to begin by sticking with old and trusted methods.

Ominously, in Kishida’s inaugural policy speech to the Diet, he chose not to mention the word reform even once. He is basically the first prime minister in more than two decades to omit it. I am told this is because he sees himself as a builder, not a reformer. If so, that could be great news. Japan thrives on the concept of kaizen, (step-by-step, incremental improvements). A builder and master-craftsman is much more revered than an ambitious reformer.

A Transformed Elite

Corporate ownership and political stability are the deep structural changes that have taken place but, perhaps most importantly, the motivation and ambition of Japan’s ruling elite has found a new focus. Simply put, the rise of China from developing economy to global competitor has focused their minds as nothing else has in decades. No, Japan does not want to become an economic colony of China.

While the past decades were marked by defeatism and fatalism, today’s Japan is marked by ambition, confidence, and a newfound idealism. Whether they are new entrepreneurs, the next generation of big-business CEOs, or the new leaders of the LDP, Japan’s elite are now united in their ambition to reassert Japan’s rightful place as a globally relevant, top-tier nation and global rule maker.

Japan wants to be Japan, not the United States and not China. Nobody yet knows what the new Japan will look like, but make no mistake: a new Japan is being created.

Yes, this time is different.

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Japan as 196th

The true nature of inward FDI and how to improve it

One hundred ninety-sixth out of 196 countries. Just behind North Korea. That’s how Japan ranked in 2019 when the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) measured the cumulative stock of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) as a share of gross domestic product (GDP).1 FDI ranges from foreign companies setting up new facilities to them buying domestic companies. What a shocking result considering the 20 years Tokyo has spent trying to increase its cumulative stock of FDI.

Unless policymakers understand why past efforts have failed, Tokyo is unlikely to realize the new goal it announced in June: to hike inward FDI to 12 percent of GDP by 2030. That would triple today’s ratio. The main hurdle is Japan’s impediments to carrying out the primary form of FDI, namely, foreign companies buying healthy ones to gain a built-in labor force, customer base, brand name, suppliers, and so forth. Typically, in a rich country, 80 percent of inward FDI takes the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). In Japan, it’s only 14 percent.

While the government has yet to see the light, two new conditions may drive substantial change anyway.

One of these is a succession crisis at small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Over the coming years, according to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 600,000 profitable SMEs may have to close because their owners are over age 70 and have no successor. Up to six million jobs are at risk.

To prevent this, a 2020 interim report of the cabinet-level FDI Promotion Council advocates helping these SMEs find suitable foreign partners by “facilitat[ing] business transfers between third parties,”; in other words, M&As. Unfortunately, the final report, published in June, has purged all talk of inward M&A. Clearly, some powerful forces feared foreign purchases more than the closure of hundreds of thousands of healthy companies. Still, the fact that the proposal even made it to the interim report is an encouraging sign.

A second potential driver is the push for corporate reform, as exemplified by the 2014 Stewardship Code and the 2015 Corporate Governance Code. The latter was proposed to the government by Nicholas Benes, a former American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) governor. Many ACCJ leaders believe that, as listed corporations face increased pressure to focus on profitability rather than just sales, they will increasingly focus on core competencies. Consequently, they will hive off lackluster divisions as well as hosts of affiliates that some other company could operate more productively. If so, this will not only boost Japan’s growth rate, but also greatly increase the number of companies available for foreign purchase.

To assess these potential drivers, let’s examine the lay of the land.

Sine Qua Non of Successful Reform

Increasing FDI was incorporated into Japan’s growth strategy by Junichiro Koizumi during his time as prime minister (2001–06). That was a welcome reversal of attitude. Hardly any country has succeeded in economic reform without embracing inward FDI. Success stories range from the developing countries of Asia to the Eastern European transition states to mature economies. A study of 19 rich countries—where cumulative FDI had risen from six percent of GDP in 1980 to 44 percent by 2019—shows that inward FDI mainly lifted growth by improving output per worker.

It is not the higher efficiency of foreign-owned enterprises that provides the main fillip to the host country. Rather, it’s the spillover effects as their new ideas boost the performance of local suppliers, business customers and, sometimes, even competitors. For example, when Japanese automakers took “transplant” factories to North America, Detroit learned that it cost less to prevent defects in the first place than to fix them afterwards. Japanese economists, such as Yasuyuki Todo, Toshihiro Okubo, and Kyoji Fukao, have found that foreign firms bring similar spillover benefits to Japan.

When Koizumi came to power in 2001, the stock of inward FDI was a minuscule 1.2 percent of GDP. In 2003, Koizumi vowed to double FDI. In 2006, he set a goal of five percent of GDP by 2011. At first, there was marked progress; by 2008, FDI had risen to four percent.

Then momentum stalled. Despite Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2013 pledge to double FDI, as of 2019 the ratio had barely risen to 4.4 percent. That figure is dwarfed by the 44 percent median ratio in other rich countries. To make matters worse, the government glosses over how badly it has failed. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) reported that inward FDI climbed to ¥40 trillion in 2020, thereby ostensibly achieving Abe’s goal. In reality, however, the 2020 figure was just ¥24 trillion, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and UNCTAD.

How is such a huge discrepancy possible? Two sets of numbers are approved by the IMF, but only one—called the directional principle—is authorized for looking at a country’s FDI over time or for comparing countries. MOF, by contrast, highlights the other set, called the asset/liability principle. The latter has its uses, but it also includes items having nothing to do with real FDI (e.g., loans from overseas affiliates back to their parents in Japan). A spokesperson for MOF confirmed that such loans accounted for most of the discrepancy. Asked about MOF’s choice of numbers, an OECD official replied: “The directional principle is better suited to analyze the economic impact of FDI. It is the recommended presentation for FDI statistics by country and industry.” If solving a problem requires recognizing that you have one—in this case low levels of inward FDI—then Tokyo is in trouble.

Why Did Japan Come in Last?

FDI has soared in other countries that switched from resisting FDI to welcoming it. In South Korea, inward FDI has leaped from two percent of GDP before reformer Prime Minister Kim Dae-Jung came to power in 1998 to 14 percent today. In India, the share has jumped from 0.5 percent in 1990 to 14 percent now. In post-Communist Eastern Europe, the ratio has mushroomed from seven to 55 percent. Why, then, have Japan’s efforts failed?

In its June policy statement, the FDI Promotion Council wrote as if Japan didn’t appeal to foreign companies. Hence, most of its focus was on creating an “attractive business environment.” But the premise is inaccurate.

In survey after survey, multinational companies list Japan as a top target due to its large, affluent market, well-educated workforce and customer base, high technological levels, and so forth. In fact, Japan came in fourth out of 27 rich countries in the 2020 Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, an annual, global survey of senior executives conducted by the US-based global consultancy Kearney. Scholars Takeo Hoshi and Kozo Kiyota calculated that, if Japan performed like other countries with similar characteristics, the ratio of inward FDI to GDP would have already reached a very impactful 35 percent by 2015. In the 2021 survey, Japan slipped to fifth overall, but topped the list for economic outlook in net terms. Business leaders were most optimistic about Japan, Germany, Canada, and Switzerland, with the United Arab Emirates and Australia tied for fifth.

The real problem is that Japan’s most attractive companies are largely off limits to foreign purchasers. The press covers the spectacular exceptions where foreign enterprises rescue failing giants such as Nissan Motor Corporation, Sharp Corporation, and Toshiba Corporation. But the data shows that most foreign investors seek good companies that can not only help their sales in Japan, but offer resources that enhance the parent’s global expansion. By contrast, most domestic purchases are largely rescue operations. The foreign firms are not pursuing companies that need downsizing. In fact, the usual Japanese target for foreign acquisition has higher profits, better technical capacity, and a greater willingness to adopt new practices than the typical organization in its industry.

Foreign companies also select fairly sizeable targets. From 1996 to 2020, non-Japanese paid $112 million for nongroup companies on the stock market and $60 million for unlisted ones. Domestic buyers bought much smaller companies: group members worth just $11 million and nongroup companies worth $30 million.

Unfortunately, the most attractive SME targets are out of reach because they belong to corporate groups—the vertical keiretsu (company networks). Japan’s 26,000 parents and their 56,000 affiliate companies employ 18 million people, a third of Japan’s employees.

This does not count other attractive companies among unaffiliated subcontractors and closely allied suppliers where the parent holds no company stock. The Toyota Group, for example, has 1,000 affiliates plus 40,000 suppliers, of which the majority are subcontractors. From 1996 to 2000, non-Japanese were only able to buy a trifling 57 member companies of corporate groups, whereas they bought about 3,000 unaffiliated companies.

This obstacle is a legacy of the early postwar era, when Tokyo restricted FDI out of fear of foreign domination. In the 1960s, when Japan had to liberalize to join the OECD, the government devised what it called liberalization countermeasures to create structural impediments. These ranged from reviving cross-shareholding among corporate giants and their financiers, to shoring up the horizontal and vertical keiretsu.

Under Koizumi, with input from ACCJ leaders such as Benes and despite the resistance of the Keidanren (the Japanese Business Federation), Tokyo reformed the company law in 2007 to make inward M&A easier. For the first time, foreign companies were allowed to use cash in so-called triangular mergers to buy 100 percent of a Japanese company’s stock and, for the first time, they could use their own stock to pay for a company using a triangular merger. In both cases, they could squeeze out small holders of stock.

In a triangular merger, the foreign buyer sets up a Japanese subsidiary as a vehicle for the purchase, and that subsidiary must meet certain conditions. Would-be buyers still face some unwieldy rules and unfavorable tax treatment, including the way capital gains are counted and taxed in stock swaps.

The good news is that, over time, many of these formal hurdles in the M&A rules have been ameliorated, or companies have found a way to outflank them, according to Benes, ACCJ FDI and Global Economic Cooperation Committee Chair Kenneth Lebrun, and former committee co-chair Bryan Norton.

Both Lebrun and Benes have, in their professional careers, represented companies involved in inward M&A. The reported intention of Western Digital Corporation to use a stock swap to pay about $20 billion for Kioxia Corporation (the chip company spun off from Toshiba), will be a test case for the ease and cost of using an option that is more common and less tax-burdensome in other countries.

Despite the remaining legal and regulatory hurdles in rules, the biggest impediment these days, said Benes, is the reluctance of companies to sell off divisions or affiliates to foreign strategic buyers. Yet he added that, largely due to governance reforms, even here the ice is beginning to crack.

“The difference now compared with 2005 is like night and day. Domestic M&A is common and, in some cases, shareholders have forced management’s takeover defenses to be dismantled. This new atmosphere may be the biggest reason to expect more FDI via M&As in the future. Still, the floodgates will open more slowly than is optimal for Japan.”

Despite this progress, many legacies of the past—from the vertical keiretsu to obsolete attitudes among some policymakers—still curb inbound M&As. One prominent US business executive noted how Toshiba’s management and METI used the pretext of “national security concerns” in a failed attempt to block a shareholder vote against management. He feared that the same thing might occur in other cases.

Officials sometimes claim they are simply acquiescing to the public’s fear of foreign takeovers. The reality is that the government lags a big change in the public mood. As early as the mid-2000s, 47 percent of respondents in surveys said the impact of foreign companies on the Japanese economy was positive, whereas only eight percent thought it was negative. Just four percent held the once-common view that foreign companies and financiers were “vultures” who wanted to buy Japanese companies on the cheap and then sell them to make a quick buck. Twenty percent of respondents said that they wanted to work for a foreign business while another 20 percent said that they did not want to. The rest offered no opinion.

Business leaders are divided. While the Keidanren has often been obstructionist, the more progressive Keizai Doyukai, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, has welcomed FDI. In 2005, during the debate over Koizumi’s Commercial Code reforms, it called for increasing inward FDI to 10 percent of GDP, twice Koizumi’s goal. It advocated revising the tax code to allow deferment of capital gains taxes on M&As financed via stock swaps while warning against proposals that would impose a more difficult capital gains tax environment. In a 2015 document, it once again advocated better tax treatment of inbound M&As.

Keidanren, by contrast, recalled Benes, successfully lobbied METI to make the tax treatment for cross-border stock swaps as “burdensome and difficult as possible.” At the very last minute, a senior METI official reversed the agreement that its own team in charge had already agreed on with MOF for convenient tax treatment. Unfortunately, the Keidanren continues to have much more sway with the government on these matters than does the Keizai Doyukai.

Three Drivers

Could inward FDI take a leap forward despite the government’s resistance to inward FDI? Yes, it’s possible because of three drivers. First, as detailed above, is the sea change in attitudes among the general public as well as parts of the business community and some officials. Second is the succession crisis at SMEs, also noted above. If necessity truly does give birth to invention, this could be the entrance ramp to making inward M&A a standard tool. How many 70-year-old owners of SMEs would refuse to sell to a foreigner, let their business die, and leave the employees jobless if the government or a big trading company made the introduction and vouched for the buyer’s intention to help them grow rather than engage in mass layoffs?

Japan already has a number of companies, such as Nihon M&A Center Inc., which arrange domestic M&As for healthy SMEs with no successor. That has made M&As more acceptable. So far, however, almost none of these cases have involved foreign buyers. There is also Japan Invest, a program of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), which actively courts foreign companies to set up greenfield operations in Japan; but it makes no effort to recruit foreign companies to buy Japanese ones. Inbound M&A should be added to JETRO’s mandate. Japan’s giant sogo shosha (general trading companies) and megabanks, with their skill sets and extensive networks inside Japan and overseas, are very well suited to act as matchmakers for inbound M&As for these SMEs. It could be a very lucrative business for them.

Studies show that SMEs are more likely to sell to a foreign company if they see that other SMEs have done so successfully. Hence, as foreigners buy and improve SMEs, the process is likely to snowball.

Will better corporate governance become a driver? Many US executives expect that it will. Speaking of return on equity (ROE), one noted: “Ten years ago, when I used the term ROE, many Japanese executives asked me what I was talking about. Not these days.” Some analysts point to companies such as Hitachi, Ltd. and Shiseido Japan, Co., Ltd. that sold healthy divisions to foreign private equity (PE) firms to focus on their most lucrative activities. Lebrun noted that, “the stock market has certainly rewarded companies that are taking these steps.”

This logic may eventually bear fruit, but it will take years to see how much impact these reforms will have. Hitachi and Shiseido are the kind of globally active corporations that are most likely to improve efficiency for their own strategic reasons, not because of new governance rules. In fact, Hitachi began divesting before the change in the two codes. While “select and focus” has been a big buzz phrase in boardrooms during the past decade, it’s hard to find data measuring how much the typical corporate giant has really implemented it, either by narrowing the range of products or shedding affiliates. In any case, the total number of subsidiaries and affiliates in 2017 was more or less the same as in 2007.

In anticipation of a boom in carve-outs, KKR, Bain & Company, Inc., CVC Capital Partners, and about 80 other domestic and foreign PE firms are building up their war chests. So far, however, the anticipated upsurge has yet to emerge. Since 2004, there have only been 10–20 domestic divestitures above ¥10 billion ($100 million) to PE firms per year, a figure that has not increased over time.

The typical sale has been priced at about ¥50 billion ($500 million), with the notable exception of 2017, when a group led by Bain paid $18 million for 40 percent of Toshiba’s memory unit. There has so far been no trend increase in the total value of deals. The delay, Bain commented in a 2018 report, is due to the fact that there is still “insufficient pressure on corporates to sell quality assets” and that “boards and shareholders do not yet push for strategic divestitures,” i.e., selling profitable but lackluster units that don’t enhance core competencies. Instead, Bain added, corporations are taking easier routes to show better ROE numbers, such as stock buybacks and selling low-quality assets, namely, those that are unprofitable or suffer declining sales and a worsening competitive position.

Regardless of any rules on paper, shareholders’ power over management is limited by a simple financial fact: Japan’s 5,000 biggest corporations have little need to raise money on the equity markets to fund new investments, since their internally generated cash flow regularly surpasses their investments in new plant and equipment. The overall decline in stable shareholders (i.e., cross-shareholders plus other management allies) should be a force for improving shareholder power. However, as Benes points out, the Financial Services Agency (FSA) has issued rules that make it hard for minority shareholders to act collectively to make suggestions to management, as they can in the United States and the UK.

Beyond that, companies can make financial measures look better without any improvement in real efficiency. For example, if companies use current profits to measure ROE or return on assets (ROA), then the Bank of Japan’s continual lowering of interest rates will make the measures look better. However, when ROA is measured in terms of operating profits—profits before interest—it’s hard to find much improvement so far.

At the 5,000 biggest corporations during 1996–2012, ROA averaged just 3.5 percent. It rose only a smidgeon to 3.8 percent from 2013 to 2019. Worse yet, these companies increased their profits primarily by cutting wages rather than improving efficiency. In 2019, operating profit per worker was 70 percent higher than in 1996, even though sales per worker were only three percent higher.

How did companies pull that off? By cutting wages three percent per staffer and thereby shifting a big chunk of value-added from wages to profits. However, for an economy to be healthy, it is necessary for productivity, profits, and wages to grow in tandem. Unless shareholders care how better profit numbers are achieved, it’s not clear how increased shareholder power would lead to more productive corporate strategies.

Perhaps changes in corporate governance rules, the succession crisis, and other drivers will eventually add up to a force powerful enough to alter deep-seated mindsets regarding product diversification, vertical keiretsu, and sales to foreign strategic investors. Still, the likelihood is that the magnitude of change required in inward FDI will require a concerted policy effort by the government and business leaders. Otherwise, when 2030 arrives, Japan might still be little better than in 196th place.

This article was adapted from Katz’s forthcoming book on reviving entrepreneurship in Japan.

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Misplaced Pressure

National security must strengthen, not close, Japan Inc.

The government of newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida deserves to be congratulated for having elevated national security to a top priority by establishing the new position of economic security minister, filled by former Ministry of Finance bureaucrat Takayuki Kobayashi. Global investors and business leaders will certainly welcome the creation of a “control tower” to coordinate, focus, and, hopefully, streamline the increasingly complex trade and investment rules and directives now governing global engagement with Japan Inc.

Unfortunately, there is significant risk in this undertaking. More bureaucracy can easily backfire. Instead of streamlining and centralizing procedures, there is a great danger of duplication and increased bureaucratic red tape, given the vested interests and institutional pride of the incumbent ministries.

Kishida’s new ministry could end up making it more difficult and cumbersome for global investors to buy Japanese companies and trade with Japanese suppliers. In the name of national security, the new Ministry of Economic Security could actually bring on a new trend of insularity and ossification in corporate Japan.

Path to Security

Of course, it is easy to understand the reason Japanese leaders feel pressured to follow the lead of the United States in seeking to raise bureaucratic and political oversight over global investment flows.

However, the fact that all this happens in the name of supposedly protecting national security is, in my view, the real red flag. Why? Because the best way to ensure economic security is to ensure that your nation’s corporate sector is strong, innovative, and globally competitive.

If corporate Japan is to have a bright future, it certainly needs more active debate with the stewards of global finance. And yes, sometimes the investors’ threats to challenge board members and existing corporate structures are absolutely key to the mid- and long-term competitiveness and sustainability of all stakeholders.

In fact, the empirical reality of Japan’s market verifies this point with great clarity. Almost all successful corporate turnarounds in past decades originated in either substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) or global investors’ lobbying for change. Nissan, Sharp, Sony, Fanuc, and Shiseido are just some of the highlights.

Make no mistake: for global relevance and future competitiveness, the more interaction with global investors, the better it will be for Japan’s national competitiveness and, thus, her national security.

Poison Pill?

Leveraging global investor knowledge and insight is an existential imperative for Japan. For all the talk about self-sufficiency, let us remember that slightly more than 60 percent of listed companies’ profits come from global sales. From here, Japan’s domestic economy probably will see lower growth than other global markets, so the need for more global and open perspectives—as well as challenges to the status quo—are poised to grow in importance.

Unfortunately, some Japanese leaders appear ready to use the powers of the new ministry to shut out global challengers and justify business as usual behind the excuse of national security.

Clear speak: Kobayashi could easily find himself leading a “poison pill” ministry, preventing necessary renewal and innovation. Domestic corporate leaders will get busy and, in the name of national security, lobby the new ministry for protection. The new ministry could easily become a creeping liability for the future dynamism and global competitiveness of corporate Japan. Clearly, corporate ossification and a retreat from globalization cannot be in Japan’s national interest.

Specifically, new and tighter rules are poised to, in effect, shut out Japanese companies from the forces of the global competition for risk capital. Under the mantle of national security, this could also feed complacency and stagnation. Already, Japanese conglomerates have fallen behind in many new leading-edge areas, such as cybersecurity, quantum computing, and drone technology.

Whether we like it or not, global finance is the most efficient and effective tool to force senior management to stay on top of their game. Therefore, there is a great risk that the new rules will merely protect already outdated technologies, feeding a new breed of so-called zombie companies in Japan. This is particularly true since, unlike the United States, where the move toward tighter restrictions began, Japanese companies no longer have a natural competitive strength in cutting-edge technology.

FDI

What about global investors? Technically, tightening national security supervision will raise both the cost of investing here as well as the risks. Internal compliance and controls will have to be tightened to ensure that new potential criminal liabilities are minimized.

Here, transparency is key. Right now, we know that rules will be tightened, but we don’t know how and where, nor on what basis. Kishida would be well advised to be more proactive and engage with foreign investors and business leaders on how to best balance national security with technology transfer, innovation, and transformation.

However, no matter how smooth the procedures may become, the net result is a higher compliance–cost base for investing in Japan. For large, established players, this should not be a problem. But smaller startups that are trying to explore opportunities in the Japanese market are poised to suffer disproportionately from the higher compliance and legal costs resulting from new rules. Tokyo’s reputation as the global finance-compliance center will grow.

From a Japan equity strategist’s perspective, much of the bull case for Japan depends on unlocking the deep value offered by Japanese businesses that is well documented in the historically low valuation metrics and high cash balances of listed companies.

We need a catalyst to unlock this value. Unfortunately, making it more difficult for non-Japanese to buy into and trade with Japan does not make it easier for Japanese to buy into Japan.

Real Needs

To truly strengthen security, the government should step up public incentives for technology companies to:

• Stretch and sweat their engineers harder by exposing them to more, not less, global exchange and interaction
• Raise R&D spending for university and corporate researchers
• Stimulate commercialization of new technologies deemed to be in the national interest by offering tax breaks to researchers, to startup entrepreneurs, and for in-house development

Protection is typically backward-looking, and what Japan needs is forward-looking incentives to unlock next-generation innovation and commercialization. To get there, Japan requires more, not less, pressure from global financial investors.

What Japan really needs are more active and engaged domestic investors and fund managers who aren’t afraid to engage and challenge senior corporate leaders. Policies designed to help domestic asset owners unlock corporate value are not just welcome, but essential to allowing a new catalyst for corporate revival.

This is where policy action is needed, to promote Japan for the Japanese. National security is based on homegrown strength and policies to unlock domestic aspirations, not on restricting global capital from becoming partners in this process.

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Make Japan a Startup Nation

How can government best encourage economic growth?

If you had two minutes with the new prime minister, to give your best-shot advice on how to create a better economic future for Japan, what would you say?

From a macro perspective, by far the best answer is: Do whatever you can to make Japan a startup nation.

But where does economic growth come from? Not from the stuff politicians and technocrats talk about most of the time—e.g., monetary, fiscal, or trade policy. And importantly, it doesn’t come from population growth. It comes from entrepreneurs.

Clear-Cut Correlation

History has confirmed again and again that we only get sustained economic growth when human ingenuity and ambition are allowed and encouraged, and people are empowered to start an enterprise and build their own business.

China long had one of the world’s highest rates of population growth, but it only started becoming an economic miracle when the Communist Party encouraged entrepreneurship and private business in the early 1980s.

More generally, the numbers speak for themselves. When you analyze the world’s 40 leading economies over the past 30 years, you find a clear-cut correlation between the percentage of entrepreneurs in the adult population and the sustainable growth of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). More entrepreneurs create higher sustainable growth. In fact, if you raise the number of entrepreneurs in the population by one percentage point, your potential GDP goes up by about half a percent.

In even simpler terms, employment data confirms the positive power of entrepreneurship: startups have created 60–70 percent of new jobs in G7 countries over the past 20 years. Specifically, here in Japan, new companies set up after 2010 have provided about 2.3 million jobs over the past decade. In contrast, companies older than 20 years actually destroyed some 800,000 jobs over the same period.

So, dear prime minister, make no mistake—startups and entrepreneurship are a nation’s single most important source of growth and prosperity.

Finding Founders

The need for entrepreneurs is clear, but where do they come from?

Unfortunately, there is no magic bullet, no one simple policy tool that can be turned on to deliver entrepreneurs and create Startup Nation Japan. However, the key ingredients are all in place and, in my personal view, I firmly believe Japan stands at the brink of a golden age of entrepreneurs and startups.

Why? It’s a combination of cyclical and structural forces. Cyclically, the Covid-19 crisis has not only freed up resources but, more importantly, has become a catalyst for many people to rethink their career and life priorities. No matter how small, a startup can finally hire people and build teams, investing in what always yields the highest returns for any new venture: human capital. One of the biggest obstacles for growth and expansion has finally disappeared.

Even the most techy of tech companies, such as Google or Amazon, did not grow by the force of their superior algorithms, business models, or charismatic leadership vision. Instead, they grew as a result of the sweat equity and animal spirits of their team leaders, sales managers, and back-office clerks who pulled all-nighters. Elon Musk’s biggest problem is not tech, engineering, or digital transformation; it is his teams, the people who actually get stuff done.

In Japan, the bar for startups to attract talent has always been especially high because top graduates strongly prefer established companies. Bigger is supposedly safer. Here again, the current recession may well mark an important turning point. Not a week goes by that we don’t read about establishment companies announcing a restructuring plan. All of a sudden, big-company job security is not what it used to be. This is great news for entrepreneurs.

To be specific, I have the good fortune of working as an adviser and angel investor for a couple of Japanese venture capital funds. Over the past six months, all the startups with which we deal have grown their staff and partners. Several have more than doubled the size of their teams. Most importantly, the quality of potential candidates has grown enormously.

One young woman from a top establishment company, who has had no overseas or global experience, told me: “Working at my current employer has been great, but now that I know how good I am, and what I want, staying there puts me at risk. I don’t want to be reassigned to some random project by some random salaryman superior. I want to create my own destiny. Your startup is the best place to do that.”

To be sure, this young woman almost certainly is exceptional, and it may very well be wrong to present her as anything like the new norm for Japanese employees. However, unlike five or 10 years ago, candidates such as her do exist, and it would be wrong to underestimate the powerful ambitions—and awareness of opportunities—that Japan’s young talents and employees are prepared to explore.

Taking the leap from exploring to actually quitting one’s job and beginning a new career at a startup venture is likely to become easier. There’s no doubt that opportunities will increase, large established companies will continue to stagnate, and more young startups will demonstrate high, sustainable growth. Opportunities worth watching include:

• Healthcare and biotech
• Professional services and process automation
• Education and deep tech-based materials
• Anything serving wealthy Japanese retirees

Some will make a fortune building the Louis Vuitton retirement communities of Japan.

Learning from the Masters

On the structural side, Japan has developed a true and sustainable ecosystem of support for startups and aspiring entrepreneurs. Not a day goes by that the major newspapers don’t advertise a startup competition or venture capital symposium. Even Keidanren—the Japan Business Federation, which is the proud sanctuary of Japan’s corporate culture—now fully embraces innovation and entrepreneurship in its strategic vision. Japan’s elite establishment now knows that BAU—business as usual—is no longer an option.

Most importantly, Japan has a new generation of successful entrepreneurs, people who have built true going concerns, who commercialized and monetized an original idea, who overcame many obstacles and difficulties to build their dream. Sure, they have money to invest; but more fundamentally, many of these new successful entrepreneurs are focused on creating a positive legacy by giving back, mentoring, and advising the next generation.

Hidden from view by media obsession with Silicon Valley superstars, Tokyo, Osaka, and Fukuoka have become hotbeds of private initiatives to grow and develop a startup culture. These include mentorship programs, incubators, accelerators, venture capital funds, and daily discussions on the drop-in audio chat app Clubhouse. This private-sector ecosystem of open discussion, sharing, and networking is vital because a sustainable startup culture can only develop if success is celebrated and, more importantly, if failure is peer-encouraged to become a catalyst for another try.

As Japan’s most successful entrepreneur, Yanai Tadashi, founder of FastRetailing, which owns Uniqlo, supposedly once said, “I failed about 25 times before I finally succeeded.”

All said, the new Japanese golden age for entrepreneurs is very exciting. If I am right, we will have to become more optimistic about the overall outlook for Japan. Because one thing is certain: private entrepreneurship—not government handouts—will build future prosperity.

Dear prime minister, I trust you understand.

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